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Abstract 
Evolution is often characterized as a tinkerer that creates efficient but messy solutions to problems. 
We analyze the nature of the problems that arise when we try to explain and understand cognitive 
phenomena created by this haphazard design process. We present a theory of explanation and 
understanding and apply it to a case problem – solutions generated by genetic algorithms. By 
analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms present to computational problems, we 
show that the reason for why evolutionary designs are often hard to understand is that they exhibit 
non-modular functionality, and that breaches of modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal 
and constitutive explanation. 
 
1 Introduction 
The once dominant classical paradigm of cognitive science has been under attack for several 
decades. Connectionism, cognitive neuroscience, dynamical systems theory, and new robotics have 
all questioned whether the classical AI approach to cognition can credibly describe biologically 
evolved cognitive systems such as human minds. Whereas classical AI tends to approach 
computational problems with functional decompositions inspired directly by the programmer’s 
intuitions about possible efficient subroutines, the alternative research programs often emphasize 
that biological evolution is more likely to produce far more complex and messy designs.  
 
In our paper we analyze the nature of the problem that these messy solutions raise to the 
understanding of cognitive phenomena. In general, the problem of understanding non-intuitive 
designs produced by natural selection is well-known in philosophy of psychology (e.g., Clark 1997, 
Ch.  5),  philosophy of  biology (Wimsatt  2007),  and now even in  popular  psychology (Marcus  2008),  
but the problem has proven to be difficult to articulate without a clear idea of what exactly it is that 
                                                             
1 The authors are listed in an alphabetical order. 
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evolutionary tinkering is supposed to hinder. The main challenge for understanding is often framed 
and explained by pointing to the path-dependent nature and the resulting unfamiliarity of the 
evolved design (Jacob 1977). We argue that this is not the whole story. We hope that providing an 
explicit theory of explanation and understanding will move us beyond intuitions towards a more 
systematic analysis and, ultimately, concrete solutions. We also combine our theory of explanatory 
understanding with a computational application of evolutionary design: problem-solutions 
generated by genetic algorithms. By analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms offer 
to computational problems, we suggest that an important reason for why evolutionary designs are 
often hard to understand is that they can exhibit non-modular functionality, and that breaches of 
modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal and constitutive explanation.  
 
2 Explanation and understanding 
The ultimate goal of cognitive neuroscience is to provide mechanistic understanding of system-level 
properties  of  the  cognitive  system  in  terms  of  the  properties  of  its  parts  and  their  organization.  
Probably the most developed account of general strategies for reaching such mechanistic 
understanding is William Bechtel’s and Robert Richardson’s (2010) study of the heuristics of 
decomposition and localization (DL).  The DL procedure goes  roughly  as  follows.  First,  the different  
phenomena that the system of interest exhibits are differentiated. Then the phenomenon of interest 
is functionally decomposed, i.e., analyzed into a set of possible component operations that would be 
sufficient to produce the phenomenon. One can think of this step as a formulation of a preliminary 
set of simple functions that taken together would constitute the more complex input-output relation 
(the system-level phenomenon). The system is also structurally decomposed into a set of component 
parts. The final step is to try to localize the component operations by mapping the operations onto 
appropriate structural component parts. The idea is thus to first come up with a set of more basic 
properties or behaviors which could, taken together, possibly result in the explanandum behavior, 
and then try to find out whether the system is in fact made of such entities that can perform the 
required tasks. If this cannot be done, the fault may lie with the functional and structural 
decompositions or with the very identification of the phenomenon, and these may then have to be 
rethought. The identification and decomposition procedures will in the beginning be guided by 
earlier theories and common sense, but empirical evidence can always suggest that a thorough 
reworking of the basic ontology and the form of the possible explananda may be in order. 
According to Bechtel and Richardson, decomposability is a regulative ideal in such model 
construction because complex systems are psychologically unmanageable for humans. 
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Decomposition allows the explanatory task to be divided into parts that are manageable for 
cognitively limited beings, thereby rendering the system intelligible (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). 
The  idea  comes  originally  from  Herbert  Simon  (1962),  who  claimed  that  the  property  of  near-
decomposability is a necessary condition of understandability to any finite cognitive agent. Near-
decomposability means that the system can be decomposed into parts in such a way that the 
intrinsic causal properties of the parts are more important for the behavior of the system than the 
relational causal properties of the components that are constituted also by their environment and 
interaction. Near-decomposable systems are thus hierarchical in the sense that the complex whole 
can be conceived of as made from a limited set of simpler parts and interactions. Hierarchical 
systems are manageable for cognitively limited beings because their ‘complete description’ includes 
irrelevant elements describing similar recurring parts and non-important interactions. The removal 
of such descriptions does not hamper our understanding of the system and thus eases cognitive 
load.  
Although there are a number of arguments that conclusively show that such informational economy  
by itself is not constitutive of understanding2, we agree with Simon in that a property closely related 
to near-decomposability, namely modularity, is a necessary condition for understanding. As a 
conceptual starting point for our argument, we follow Petri Ylikoski and Jaakko Kuorikoski in 
conceiving understanding not as a special mental state or act, but as a regulative label attributed 
according to manifest abilities in action and correctness of reasoning. Understanding is a public, 
behavioral concept. Cognitive processes (comprehension) taking place in the privacy of individual 
minds are a causal prerequisite for possible fulfillment of these criteria, but the processes 
themselves are not the facts in virtue of which somebody understands or not. They are not the 
criteria of understanding in the sense that we would have to know them in order to say whether 
somebody really understands something. (Ylikoski 2009; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010)  
We take the primary criterion of understanding to be inferential performance: whether someone 
understands a concept is evaluated according to whether he or she can make the right inferential 
connections to other concepts. Likewise, whether someone understands a phenomenon is assessed 
based on whether he or she can make correct inferences related to it. This view can be further 
                                                             
2 First, nobody has actually succeeded in giving a positive argument for equating understanding with increased 
informational economy (Barnes 1992). Second, successful classification schemes compress information by 
facilitating inferences to properties probably possessed by individuals on the basis of belonging to a certain 
known class. However, classification schemes by themselves are usually taken to be merely descriptive and not 
explanatory. The same general point can be drawn from standard statistical procedures, which by themselves 
only summarize the data, but do not explain it. (Woodward 2003, 362-364.) 
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developed by linking it to James Woodward’s account of scientific explanation in the following way: 
Woodward’s theory of explanation tells us more specifically what kinds of inferences are constitutive 
of specifically explanatory understanding. According to Woodward (2003), explanation consists in 
exhibiting functional dependency relations between variables. Knowledge of explanatory 
relationships facilitates understanding by implying answers to what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions concerning the consequences of counterfactual or hypothetical changes in the values of 
the explanans variable. Whether someone understands a phenomenon is evaluated according to 
whether he or she can make inferences not only about its actual state, but also about possible states 
of the phenomenon or system in question. In the case of causal explanations, these explanatory 
dependencies concern the effects of interventions and knowledge of causal dependencies thus 
enables the possessor of this knowledge to act and possibly manipulate the object of explanation. 
These answers are the basis of the inferential performance constitutive of understanding.  
The limits of inferential performance depend causally on contingencies related to the reasoning 
processes of the agents whose understanding is being evaluated. Thus the limits of understanding 
are dependent on the cognitive make-up of agents and can certainly be investigated psychologically. 
For  example,  if  the  space  limit  of  our  working  memory  is  indeed  roughly  seven  items,  then  this  
constitutes an upper boundary for the complexity of our inferences and, consequently, for our 
understanding.  
In order for answers to what-if questions to be well defined, the dependencies grounding the 
answers have to possess some form and degree of independence such that a local change in an 
aspect of the phenomenon under study cannot ramify uncontrollably or intractably. If local 
modifications in a part of a system disrupt other parts (dependencies) in a way that is not explicitly 
specified (endogenized) in the (internal or external) representation of the system according to which 
the what-if inferences are made, the consequences of these changes are impossible to predict and 
counterfactual assertions impossible to evaluate. Things participating in the dependency relations 
also have to be somewhat localized (physically and/or conceptually) in order for the contemplated 
changes  to  be  well  defined  in  the  first  place.  (Woodward  2003,  333.)  Therefore  a  necessary  
condition for a representation to provide understanding of a phenomenon is that the modularity in 
the representation matches the modularity in the phenomenon. 
Let us first discuss the case of causal understanding. If an intervention on a causal system actually 
changes  the  system  in  a  way  that  is  not  represented  in  the  model  of  the  system,  the  model  as  it  
stands does not give correct answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning the 
state of the system after the intervention. If we intervened on a causal input corresponding to 
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variable Xi in a model and the intervention, no matter how surgical, also changed the dependencies 
within the system or values of other variables themselves affecting variables causally downstream of 
Xi, the model would give incorrect predictions about the consequences of the intervention. Hence, 
the model would not provide correct causal understanding of the workings of the system and the 
causal role of the variable in it. If the system cannot be correctly modeled on any level of description 
or decomposition so that it is modular in such a way – if the system itself is not causally modular – 
no what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning interventions in the system can be 
answered and there is no causal understanding of the system to be had. If the system is in fact such 
that every local change brings about intractable changes elsewhere in the system to such an extent 
that there can be no representation that would enable a cognitively finite being to track these 
changes and make correct inferences about their consequences, then the system is beyond the 
limits of understanding.  
The problem of understanding causally non-modular systems has received some attention in the 
philosophy of science literature (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Ch. 9). However, according to 
the schema of Bechtel and Richardson, before we can even start thinking about acquiring causal-
mechanical understanding of the system realizing the complex behavior to be understood, we need 
to formulate hypotheses about the possible functional decompositions of the behavior (see also 
Cummins 1983). For example, what kind of simpler subtasks could possibly produce complex 
cognitive capacities such as language production and comprehension, long-term memory, and three-
dimensional vision? Importantly, these hypotheses are separate, though not independent, from 
hypotheses concerning the implementation of the capacity. Although the understanding offered by 
the functional decomposition is not strictly speaking causal – component operations do not cause 
the whole behavior because they are constitutive parts of it3 – the modularity constraint on 
understandability still applies in the following way. We can only understand the complex behavior by 
having knowledge of the component operations if we can make reliable what-if inferences 
concerning the possible consequences of changes in the component operations for the properties of 
the more complex explanandum capacity. We provisionally understand working memory if we can 
infer from possible changes in its hypothesized component operations (such as differences in the 
postulated phonological loop or episodic buffer) to changes in the properties of the capacity. These 
inferences are only possible if the functional decomposition itself is suitably modular, i.e., the 
consequences of “local“ changes in component operations do not ramify in an intractable way 
                                                             
3 Although we fully agree with Piccinini and Craver (2011) in that insofar as functional decompositions are 
explanatory, they are to be thought of as mechanism sketches and that the functional hypotheses are not 
independent of the question of mechanistic implementation.  
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making the behavior of the whole completely holistic. We now argue that genetic algorithms 
demonstrate that design by selection can lead to such non-modular complex behavior. 
 
3 Genetic algorithms 
Since the 1960s, there have been attempts to apply insights from evolutionary thinking to computer 
programming. Here we discuss one genre of evolutionary programming: genetic algorithms (cf. 
Holland 1975; Goldberg 1989; Mitchell 1996). In a nutshell, the idea of the genetic-algorithms 
approach is to “breed” randomly generated solutions to computational problems. This is done by 
mimicking the evolutionary mechanisms of inheritance, mutation, selection and crossover in a 
computer simulation. Although genetic algorithms (henceforth GAs) are not the only strand of 
evolutionary programming, they serve our purpose well because their basic principles are easy to 
understand and they are the most well-known kind of evolutionary programming outside computer 
science (Clark 1997, 2001; Mitchell 2009).  
 
From the point of view of AI, genetic algorithms are a form of non-exhaustive but massively parallel 
search in the search space of a problem. They can be used for a number of different purposes: for 
evolving behavioral strategies for simulated agents, for finding weights for a connectionist network, 
or  for  evolving  cellular  automata  to  perform  computations.  We  illustrate  the  nature  of  GAs  by  
presenting a simple example from Melanie Mitchell (2009, Ch. 9). Mitchell’s original simulation 
showed how GAs can be used to evolve a controlling program for a simulated robot picking up soda 
cans in a 10x10 grid. Robby the robot can only see squares that are adjacent to its location (center, 
North, South, East, West), and each turn it can either move one step to a particular direction, move 
at random, try to pick up a can, or do nothing. Each simulation run lasts for a predetermined amount 
of time steps (originally 200), and Robby's task is to pick up as many randomly situated soda cans as 
possible.  
 
 Genome G: 
254355153256235251056355461151336154151034156110550150052030256256132252350325112
052333054055231255051336154150665264150266506012264453605631520256431054354632404
350334153250253251352352045150130156213436252353223135051260513356201524514343432 
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Figure 1. (taken from Mitchell 2009, 137). Each “locus” in the genome G corresponds to one of the 
possible immediate environmental states of Robby and each digit (the allele) to a move in that 
situation (e.g. ‘0’ Æ ‘move north’, ‘5’ Æ ‘pick up’).  
 
Initially a random population of software individuals is generated, each with a “genome” consisting 
of 243 random numbers. Each locus in the genome guides Robby’s behavior in a particular situation 
(Fig 1). The fitness score of each candidate program in the population is calculated by running 
several simulation trials: crudely, the more cans the robot is able to pick up by average, the higher its 
fitness. Programs with the highest fitness scores are then used to form the next generation of 
programs:  they  are  paired  randomly,  and  the  genomes  of  the  two  parents  are  crossed  over  at  a  
randomly chosen point to create the genomes of new individuals. Finally, for each descendant, there 
is a small probability (.05) that a mutation occurs in its chromosome. As a result, the new generation 
is based on the most successful variants among the previous generation and the process loops back 
to the fitness-calculation phase. Thus the GA continues searching for efficient solutions to the 
problem by investigating the surrounding areas in the search space.  
 
After a few hundred generations, the evolved strategies start to achieve impressing results in the 
simulated task. As we replicated Mitchell’s simulation, we observed that after the 800th generation, 
the best strategies among evolved Robbys started to have higher fitness scores than a simple 
“rational” solution programmed by a human designer (ultimately 480 vs. 420 points). However, 
although solutions found with GAs are efficient, their behavior is often hard to understand. The 
ingenious heuristics that the programs employ cannot be deciphered by simply looking at individual 
genes or sets of genes. Instead, looking holistically at the broad phenotypic behavior of the robot is 
necessary. A nice illustration of this impenetrability of such evolved solutions is the fact that in some 
cases when a highly evolved Robby is in the same square with a can, it decides not to pick it up, but 
rather chooses to move away from the square. While this behavior seems prima facie irrational, 
looking at the total behavioral profile of the robot uncovers a cunning strategy: Robby uses cans as 
markers to remember that there are cans on its side and explores the adjacent squares for extra 
cans  before  picking  up  the  marker  can.  Thus  by  not  treating  cans  only  as  targets  but  also  as  
navigational tools, Robby uses its environment to extend its severely limited visual capacities and to 
compensate for its total lack of memory. 
 
 8
Moreover, by examining the behavior of a 1500th generation Robby that has the highest fitness score 
in  its  population,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  marker  strategy  manifests  in  slightly  different  ways  in  
different environmental situations. It is therefore not a discrete adaptation, but rather a collection of 
independently evolved sub-strategies. Furthermore, the marker strategy appears to tightly 
intertwine with other environment-employing “hacks” that the sophisticated Robby uses: when 
there is already a lot of empty space on the grid, Robby employs a “vacuum-cleaner” movement 
strategy.  It  follows  the  walls  of  the  board,  departing  toward  the  center  when  it  detects  a  can,  
employs  the  marker  strategy  if  possible,  and  immediately  after  cleaning  up  its  local  environment,  
returns directly to the south wall to continue its round around the board. 
 
Such kluges are common to designs created by GAs. Like biological evolution, GAs can come up with 
solutions that a human designer would not usually think of. These solutions often offload parts of 
problem solving to the environment, and thus rely on a tight coupling between the system and its 
environment. And as pointed out by Clark (1997, 2001), recurrent circuitry and complex feedback 
loops between different levels of processing often feature in systems designed by GAs. Such designs 
are often difficult to understand. We claim that such difficulties in understanding are often created 
by the lack of modularity in the functional decomposition of the behavior. This point can be 
illustrated by looking again at the genome of our most successful Robby (genome G in Fig 1). Robby 
is leaving cans as markers only in specific situations and only the totality of this selective marking 
strategy, together with navigational strategies utilizing cans and walls, constitutes the effectiveness 
of the search procedure. Looking at isolated genes in Robby’s genome only reveals trivially modular 
elements corresponding to elementary subtasks in Robby’s behavior: one gene corresponds to an 
elementary move in a specific environmental situation. But we cannot make inferences from local 
hypothetical changes in these elemental behaviors to consequent effects on fitness. The connection 
between any single elementary behavioral rule and the strategy is simply too complex and context 
dependent. A change in a single rule (in situation B and a can present, whether to pick or not to pick 
the can up) has consequences for the effectiveness of the other elementary behavioral rules 
constituting the navigational strategy. Explanatorily relevant inferences would require an extra 
“level” of modular sub-operations between the individual movements and the strategy as a whole. 
The marker and vacuum-cleaner strategies mentioned above are examples of such middle-level sub-
operations, but they are by themselves insufficient to yield understanding of the whole behavior of 
our most successful Robby, since the effectiveness of leaving a can is a result of the evolved match 
between the specific situations in which Robby leaves a can and the rest of the navigation behavior. 
And genetic algorithms do not, in general, produce such easily discernible designs. Rather, only by 
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simultaneously looking at constellations of different genes, and eventually the whole genome, the 
interesting heuristics in the system’s behavior can be revealed - if at all.  
 
To recapitulate, our example exhibits several distinct (yet related) challenges to understanding: 
1. The discernible middle-level strategies (marker, vacuum cleaner) do not have a dedicated 
structural basis. Instead, the nature of the design process leaves all atomic structural 
elements  (the  243  DNA  elements)  open  for  exploitation  by  all  capacities  serving  the  main  
goal. In consequence, the system is not structurally or behaviorally nearly-decomposable, 
but instead has ”a flat hierarchy.” Strategies are implemented in highly distributed 
structures, and as pointed out in section 2, this raises a challenge for human cognitive 
capacities. 
2. Challenge 1 above means that the interactions between subtasks tend to be strong: a 
change in one subtask constituting a part of the marker-behavior affects also the functioning 
of the vacuum-cleaner navigation. In general the middle-level strategies can only be 
discerned and defined in a very abstract way and the interaction-effect in their contribution 
to the overall fitness is so large as to make any inferences about the consequence of partial 
changes in one strategy next to impossible. 
3. The way in which operations contribute to the fitness of the individual is highly context-
dependent and depends on the properties of the environment as well as the DNA of the 
agent. For instance, merely detecting the existence of the marker strategy requires that 
there are suitable clusters of cans in the environment. Moreover, even small modifications 
to  the  environment  can  lead  to  drastic  changes  in  the  performance  of  a  strategy.  For  
instance, adding only a few randomly placed extra walls on the grid radically collapses the 
average score of the successful Robby described above. 
 
Extrapolating from this very simple case, GAs may yield functional decompositions of the problem 
that do not follow a tidy hierarchical decomposition into modular subtasks, whose individual 
contributions would be easy to understand (i.e., we could infer how a change in a sub-routine would 
affect the behavior of the mother-task). Instead, feedback, many tasks using same subtasks as 
resources, and environment couplings lead to holistic design where almost “everything is relevant 
for everything.” The evolved functional architecture is flat in that there are few discernible levels of 
order between the elementary operations and the complex whole. The counter-intuitiveness of such 
flat architectures is apparent in the deep mistrust faced by connectionist suggestions for non-
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hierarchical design of cognitive capacities (see e.g., Rumelhart and McClelland 1986 vs. Pinker and 
Prince 1988). 
 
Furthermore, GAs underscore the path dependence of evolutionary problem solving. For sufficiently 
complex computational problems there are often several local maxima in the fitness landscape of 
the problem, and the population can converge to different maxima in different runs of the 
simulation. The functional decomposition that a human designer comes up with is just one possible 
solution among several others. Perhaps our biological evolution actually ended up with a radically 
different one. 
 
4 Lessons for the study of mind 
 
Genetic algorithms seem to demonstrate that evolution can in principle lead to non-modular 
functionality. This imposes a limit on our ability to understand such behavior: if we cannot trace the 
consequences of changes in the sub-operations, we cannot answer what-if questions concerning the 
complex behavior. Such behavior also constitutes a thorny problem for mechanistic understanding 
of the implementation of the said behavioral capacities, since the DL heuristic cannot even get off 
the ground. We can now ask two questions: should we expect to find such non-modular functionality 
in nature, especially in human cognition, and if so, what attitude should we adopt with respect to 
this problem. Should the aim of causal-mechanistic understanding of the brain be given up and 
replaced with a program of instrumentally interpreted dynamical models and modeling the 
dynamics of the mind with a few macro-variables? 
 
There are important disanalogies between GAs and biological evolution. (1) in GAs, there usually is 
no genotype–phenotype distinction. In biological evolution, however, genes do not directly cause 
properties of the phenotype, but rather participate in guiding ontogenesis. There have been 
suggestions that ontogenesis itself favors modular design. GAs may also seem a problematic 
platform for exploring the possibilities of DL heuristics, since the lowest level of functional 
organization and the level of implementation are the same (i.e., the genome). However, we see no 
reasons why this would affect our argument. Moreover, the argument developed here is about 
selection in general, and failures of functional modularity may in principle also arise in the course of 
development  –  at  least  if  the  idea  of  neuronal  group  selection  or  “neural  Darwinism”  is  taken  
seriously. 
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(2)  Most  studies  on  genetic  algorithms  are  carried  out  by  using  a  single  fixed  goal  or  a  fixed  task  
type. In the Robby example, although the distribution of the cans was generated at random, the task 
itself remained essentially the same from generation to generation. However, Nadav Kashtan and 
Uri Alon (2005, see also Kashtan et al.  2007) have demonstrated that when the goals themselves are 
composed of modularly varying sub-goals, evolution produces modular functionality. It is easy to see 
why this is the case. If the tasks to which the system has to adapt to remains the same, the selection 
environment is stable and the peaks in the fitness landscape are immovable, then selection favors 
strategies which offload problem solving to that particular environment as much as possible. But if 
the task itself is composed of changing subtasks, it makes sense to design the adaptive response in 
such a way that a particular sub-operation can locally adapt to a local change in a subtask without 
altering the totality of the otherwise well functioning behavior. 
It seems likely that cognition has evolved in such a modularly changing selection environment, but 
the extent to which we should expect to find modular functionality in human cognition is hard to 
estimate and is most probably a purely empirical matter. Moreover, as a response to Simon’s (1962) 
Tempus and Hora argument, it has been argued that componential specialization in complex systems 
is  a  force  that  works  against  the  development  of  strictly  modular  structures  (e.g.,  Levins  1973,  
Wimsatt 2007, 186–192). Nonetheless, these arguments as such give us no reason to believe that 
the produced functional decomposition should respect any intuitive constraints, such as those 
derived from introspection on our thought processes or the way in which we would program a 
strategy to tackle similar cognitive challenges. 
Genetic algorithms demonstrate that evolution can create designs which are in principle beyond the 
understanding of unaided cognitive beings such as us. Yet there is nothing mysterious in such 
designs. Simon pondered whether the relative abundance of hierarchical nearly decomposable 
complexity was due to our selective attention to precisely such systems, but we believe this to be a 
somewhat hasty conjecture. We have no trouble finding and delineating systems, such as Robby or 
possibly ourselves, with behaviors which are functionally non-decomposable and constituted by a 
flat architecture. However, there certainly might be a psychological bias that makes us see 
hierarchical design also where there is none. One way of coping with this impasse is to realize that 
there are no fundamental reasons to limit the relevant understanding epistemic agent  to  be  an  
unaided human. Although only a human agent can experience a sense of understanding, this feeling 
should not be confused with understanding itself. Therefore brute computational approaches can 
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produce understanding as long as the understanding subject, the cognitive unit whose inferential 
abilities are to be evaluated, is conceived as the human-computer pair. 
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